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Thank you, and good afternoon. I'll have to say that we
didn't have any get-togethers like this symposium when I was
at Santa Clara some thirty-five years ago. You all have come
a long way since the old days, and I join Matt in
congratulating you on putting together a program that
focuses squarely on an issue that has sparked fires across the
country. I'd like to explore with you today why Kelo1 is such a
hot issue.
To put this issue into context, it is important to
understand that as recently as 20 years ago there was
virtually no debate on property rights; it was a musty, back-
of-the-library topic fit only for a few professors and maybe a
law review article or two. In the 1980s, I was sort of known
as the property rights guy around the U.S. Justice
Department-always bringing up this obscure subject that
nobody else really wanted to talk much about. Even so, with
the support of Attorney General Meese, we had a few modest
successes in the lower courts, and President Reagan did sign
an executive order dealing with property rights (EO 12,630).
The Justice Department also filed amicus briefs in some of
the key cases-the First English case,2 Williamson County,3
* Chairman of the Board of Directors, Defenders of Property Rights, and
founding partner, Marzulla & Marzulla, Washington, D.C. J.D., Santa Clara
University School of Law, 1971; B.A., Santa Clara University, 1968.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). First English held that temporary takings
denying a landowner all use of his or her property are not different in kind from
permanent takings, and require compensation just as permanent takings do.
See id. at 318. It also held that the just compensation clause is self-executing,
and entitles a landowner to bring an inverse condemnation action in order to
secure that compensation. See id. at 321.
3. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
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MacDonald v. Yolo County,4 and so forth.
Nevertheless, at that time our goal was pretty modest, I
think: that when we said "Fifth Amendment," the automatic
association would be something other than "privilege against
self-incrimination". But the problem with setting modest
goals is that you often achieve them. Today, I think that we
can safely say that we've accomplished that goal; I think that
there's nobody in the room who is going to leave without
understanding that the Fifth Amendment also has a just
compensation clause that says, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
Still, the obscure stirrings of the property rights
movement back in the 1980's hardly explains why the Santa
Clara Law Review has organized this symposium today, and
why the Kelo decision has generated such interest. In short,
the question is: "Why the fuss?" If the Kelo case really simply
confirmed what we'd all known from Berman5 and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff: 6 that "public use" in the Fifth
Amendment really means "public purpose." That public
purpose is, of course, as broad as the powers of government,
and is fundamentally measured by a rational basis test, a test
which has a very slim (approaching zero) role for the
judiciary.' So I ask again why, twenty years after Midkiff,
are we holding this symposium? And where were you all
twenty years ago when the public use definition was fixed by
the Supreme Court in Midkiff?
The great thing about a rhetorical question is that you
also get to answer it. I'd like to exercise that prerogative by
suggesting that the Kelo case was the right set of facts at the
right time. I'd like to think that the many people that have
worked in the property rights field over the twenty years
since Midkiff to bring to the public's attention the importance
of our property rights might all have had something to do
with today's symposium, and that perhaps now we are at a
point where we recognize that the right to the ownership of
property-particularly of property which constitutes a home,
a community-is tied together with the fundamental notion of
individual liberties. That is, property rights are integrated
4. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
5. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
6. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
7. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005).
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into our fundamental notion of what a community is and
what a person is. And that to the extent that government
intervenes in those very precious (and to some people both
constitutionally protected and, some might even say,
bordering on sacred) rights, that government's intrusions
must be carefully examined, and in a proper world, they also
ought to be limited.
I'd like to touch on three topics today: the constitutional
law implications of Kelo, the social implications, and the
economic implications.
I touch first on constitutional law because I thought I
heard that first panel talking about the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution. Can somebody give me the cite for
the eminent domain clause in the Constitution? Right-there
is none. In a constitutional law structure, we, the people,
have by compact-by contract-delegated to the government
certain essential powers. And we look to that Constitution to
determine what those powers are. We look to the words of
the contract. I submit that it is a dangerous thing to start
recognizing inherent sovereign powers, powers that we the
people didn't give to the central government that are
necessarily unlimited precisely because there are no words
describing them, because we never actually gave them to the
central government.
Now, you might say as a matter of practicality, the
government must have eminent domain powers. And you
might say that the Fifth Amendment recognizes there are
eminent domain powers; hence, the reference to public use. I
would concede both of those points. What I would add,
however, is that it is a most difficult and extraordinary
undertaking for the Supreme Court, interpreter of the written
Constitution (Marbury v. Madison),' to launch into defining
the nature and extent of a power (the eminent domain
power), which is not even delegated to the central government
in our Constitution.
Sure, you might say, "Come on everybody knows that you
can't write everything down. There must be some
fundamental sovereign powers that just aren't mentioned, but
are assumed." But cannot the same be said of the
fundamental sovereign power to lay and collect taxes? That's
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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in the written Constitution. How about the power to raise an
army? Isn't that a pretty sovereign power? But it's in the
Constitution, too. What about the power to establish post
offices and build post roads? That's there, too.
So let me highlight for you initially the challenge, the
difficulty, and ultimately the danger to a constitutional
system in which we are cut loose from the moorings of our
written constitution and start discovering powers in the
central government that are not delegated to it by that
constitution. Necessarily, those powers are unlimited. The
Fifth Amendment, just to respond to the argument that
someone will make, certainly does reference the right to just
compensation when property is taken for public use. It
recognizes that property, of course, can be taken for public
use, but it certainly does not define or give to the government
that power. Rather, like the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is in fact a limitation upon the exercise of that
power. So I suggest to you that the first point, and perhaps
one of the reasons that some of us are stirred up about the
Kelo decision, is precisely because it reminds us that we may
not have protections against inherent powers which aren't
granted to the government in the Constitution in the first
place. Okay, that's the constitutional law part of my
presentation; this is the law review symposium after all.
Let's move on to social implications. What do I know
about social implications? Well, I guess I know one thing and
that is that the great debate over Kelo is the great debate
between libertarianism on the one hand-that is, people who
focus upon the rights of the individual-and utilitarianism on
the other, or people who focus upon the accomplishment of
social goals.
Are there any Trekkies in the audience? You may
remember the guiding principle for the Vulcans was that the
needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. It was a
strictly utilitarian approach that said that we've got to
sacrifice the individual for the benefit of society as a whole. I
suggest to you that that is not the foundation upon which our
government was based. Rather, our government was based
on the Lockean notion of the individual being paramount, of a
government not having inherent powers, not having powers
that are passed on by divine right or otherwise through
lineage. Our Constitution is predicated on the fundamental
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concept of a government which has only the powers delegated
to it by the people, not one having powers that infringe upon
the inherent and natural rights of the individual. And that's
why it seems to me that the Supreme Court two hundred
years ago in Calder v. Bull' could say, to take property from A
and give it to B is against reason and justice. And you'll note
that that's how Justice O'Connor starts her dissent in Kelo as
well. 10
But notice that the Supreme Court did not say taking
property from A and giving it to B is against the Constitution;
the Court said that it is against reason and justice. And I
think what that reflects is a notion that the protections of our
constitutional system-the structure and the underlying
premises of our constitutional system-recognize that the
individual ought not be made to sacrifice his or her rights, at
least unnecessarily, for the public good. Where do you strike
that balance? That's perhaps the topic for next year's
symposium.
Finally, let's go to the third point, which is the economic
impact, the unintended consequences, some of which Matt
talked about, and just a few others of which I'd like to
identify. First of all, I am hardly the expert and can't really
add too much to the discussion of whether so-called economic
development projects, whatever they may be, are good or bad,
whether they make money or lose money. What I find in
taking a look at a couple of these litigations involving
baseball and football stadiums in New York and Washington,
D.C., where there are big fights over that right now, is you
bring in your accountants, they bring in their accountants,
somebody brings in the guys who used to work for Enron, and
you can probably get any answer you want as to whether or
not economic development projects are actually economically
good or bad.
In fact, it seems to me that most of the time this debate,
on its face about economics, is fundamentally the same
argument as the one we just discussed-that between the
utilitarians and the libertarians. It's the argument between
the economy interveners-we'll call them the planners-and
9. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
10. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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the free market folks. That is, do you believe that
gentrification, or the updating and improvement of the
buildings and facilities and businesses with the jobs they
bring and so forth, is good or bad? This is the
Walmart/Costco question, and indeed it obviously poses the
fundamental conundrum that Matt referred to: gentrification,
by its very nature, is upscaling and upheaving; it means
moving out the current residents to make way for the
"gentry."
Now, here's the question I suggest needs to be dealt with
in the context of this discussion of economic impact: to what
extent does government have the right to choose economic
winners and losers? To what extent should the government of
New London, Connecticut, be involved in helping a
corporation build a hotel, build condominiums, build
whatever, at the expense of Suzette Kelo and her neighbors?
Certainly there are economic benefits to someone, but often
those benefits are gained at the expense of someone else. So
it takes us back to the macro question: is it economically
beneficial? Maybe yes, but as to certain individuals, are there
losers-economic losers as well as social losers? I think the
answer is yes. It seems to me that in the end, the question to
focus on is: how much of our constitutional liberty are we
willing to concede in an effort to achieve what we believe is
going to end up an economically beneficial project in a given
circumstance.
To catalyze this discussion, I will throw out one thought.
Benjamin Franklin, railing against some of his more
apathetic fellow citizens at the time of the Revolution,
commented that "Those who are willing to give up their
liberty in the pursuit of their security deserve neither".
Thank you.
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